Access levels of skills and MCP servers

The access level of every catalog entry and the reasons behind it. The level shows what a tool adds to what the agent can already do. It does not rate code quality.

Broad access

    • The skills run, test and ship code autonomously
    • They spin up cloud boxes and delegate work to other CLI agents, running shell commands and scripts
    • Starts agent CLIs that edit files and run commands, and the package itself runs generated shell commands after your actions
    • Passes code, diffs, git history and screenshots from the editor to agents
    • Automatic test runs after edits are switched on by the ai-code-auto-test-type setting
    • Sends instructions to running agents, including remotely from Telegram and Slack
    • Changes agent and MCP settings in the project
    • Employees drive your browser and PC inside your signed-in accounts
    • Scheduled routines read your inbox, ad accounts and customer data and prepare actions in your name
    • The last click stays yours only until you release a channel for autonomous work
    • The OData client can create, update and delete 1C database records, not just read them
    • The 1C login and password are stored in .env in plain text
    • Executes arbitrary C# code in the editor
    • Can delete project assets, scripts and packages
    • The agent changes actors, assets, Blueprints and C++ code of the project, and rql-mutate mutations touch editor data
    • Cloud mode sends editor commands and data to the ai-game.dev service
    • Create paid Azure resources
    • Contributor and RBAC Administrator rights are needed
    • Runs agents with terminal and repository access
    • Opens network connections between machines
    • Installs via a script from the internet
    • Starts a browser with remote debugging and drives your logged-in sessions on third-party platforms
    • Seeds a separate debug profile from your browser data
    • Automating these platforms may violate their terms of use
  • AI-EDTPlugin
    • Changes configuration metadata and code and updates the connected infobase
    • Controls the debugger and reads infobase data
  • AIO SandboxMCP server
    • Executes arbitrary shell commands and code inside the container on the agent's request
    • Without a configured access key the container's services are unauthenticated
    • Gives the agent control over the sandbox's browser and filesystem
  • AIPexMCP server
    • It controls your real browser with open sessions
    • It can perform on-page actions and read page content
  • ANUSCLI
    • The agent executes shell commands and edits project files, and a line starting with `!` runs a command directly
    • File contents and prompts go to free providers, some of which may use them for training
    • Provider keys sit in the `auth.json` file under `~/.anus/agent`
  • AOCI-CODEMCP server
    • Writes index files, agent rules and an `.aoci/` directory into the repository, and with `--hooks` edits the agent settings
    • Connects to the database you declare through a connection string from an environment variable and reads table metadata
    • Starts background processes: the MCP server and a local panel on a loopback address
  • ARISPlugin
    • Autonomously runs experiments and executes code with minimal supervision
    • Calls external models to review steps
  • ARL-NextMCP server
    • The ARL token opens the company's whole database of assets, vulnerabilities and found leaks, and replies land in the model's context
    • The platform itself scans external targets with Nmap and Nuclei, and unauthorized scanning of other people's systems is illegal
    • The ARL_TLS_VERIFY=false variable disables certificate checks and allows connection interception
    • Creates, changes and deletes projects, tasks and knowledge in your Neo4j database
    • The atlas_database_clean tool wipes the whole database in one call
    • Keeps the Neo4j password in the client config or in .env
    • Uses AWS credentials and can run aws commands
    • Cloud actions can change infrastructure and costs
  • ActionbookMCP server
    • The agent clicks, types and runs JavaScript in your signed-in sessions, and actions taken on sites in your name cannot be undone
    • The extension reads and changes cookies and asks for access to all addresses, so data from gated pages reaches the agent
    • Page content and commands pass through the hosted server edge.actionbook.app, and an outside service, Clerk, handles sign-in
  • AdLoopMCP server
    • Writes to live Google Ads and Reddit Ads accounts and manages campaign budgets
    • OAuth grants access to conversion data, search terms and Tag Manager and Search Console settings
    • In the hosted edition, tokens and history are stored on AdLoop Cloud servers in Germany
    • The generic direct_request and vk_ads_request tools can call any API method, including changing campaigns
    • Ad tokens are stored as Cloudflare Workers secrets
    • Server access is protected only by a secret in the URL path
    • May send messages and actions in chat on request without a separate confirmation screen
    • Works with seller tokens and CRM via a third-party hosted dashboard
    • Launches local agent CLIs that run commands and change files in the working folder
    • Stores model provider keys in ~/.agent-apprenticeship/.env.local and sends task context to those providers
    • In the public mode shares learning signals with the shared ecosystem
    • Launches agents as child processes with full terminal and system access, same as a plain CLI
    • It starts, restarts and closes agent sessions and sends them messages, and worktree scripts from the repository run as you after approval
    • The conductor mode accepts commands from Telegram or Slack through a background bridge, so sessions can be controlled from a phone
    • Web mode puts session terminals in a browser on port 8420, with access protected by a token
    • The skills let an agent create, assign and cancel board tasks and submit work using Realmroot tokens
    • The worker agent edits the repository and runs git push and gh commands through Realmroot
    • The maintainer agent acts on a schedule with no human present at launch
    • `sync-skills` changes links in `~/.codex` and `~/.claude`, and the shared `AGENTS.MD` sets rules for all your agent tasks
    • The set includes skills that send messages, buy numbers and text through Twilio, change DNS and deploy code with Wrangler
    • `browser-use` works in your Chrome with its open sessions, and several skills read messenger conversations
    • The skills run gcloud commands that change cloud infrastructure and IAM permissions
    • Actions in Google Cloud may incur charges and affect production projects
    • The skills read Apple Mail, call the Google Workspace and Sentry APIs and work with local keys
    • The extensions replace the bash tool, run child processes in tmux and can trust repositories automatically
    • The web-browser skill controls Chrome, while ghidra and openscad launch external programs
    • The MCP Server calls your AWS account API and runs scripts
    • It can create and change cloud resources
    • The launch commands switch off permission prompts for both agents by default, so they run commands and edit files without your confirmation
    • A background process listens on local ports from 4500 and relays messages between the agents
    • One agent's message content flows into the other agent's thread, so instructions inside it may be acted on
    • It connects to an external service and joins live meetings on your behalf
    • It can create an AgentCall account and spend credits, sending voice and screenshots to the cloud
  • AgentDockMCP server
    • Runs commands and edits files on real machines and servers
    • Exposes network access to the runtime with a token
  • AgentSysPlugin
    • Creates branches and PRs and merges in the remote repository
    • Runs shell commands and multiple agents
    • Skills directly modify configuration XML metadata and write to the 1C infobase via 1cv8.exe
    • Needs an Anthropic API key and 1C admin database credentials in local files
  • AgentgatewayMCP server
    • Sits in the path of all agent traffic to MCP servers, LLMs and other agents
    • Configures authentication and access policies; a misconfiguration can open up unintended access
    • Agents run tests and arbitrary commands in the project
    • Chaos and pentest agents can inject faults and probe test environments
    • Creates a local database and agent configuration in the project
    • The agent writes and edits files and runs shell commands, with the sandbox enabled by the --sandbox flag
    • The gateway opens a web interface and takes instructions from messengers, so protect it with a password and do not expose the port
    • Provider keys, sessions and memory sit in ~/.agentica and part of the context goes to the chosen model provider
  • AgenvoyMCP server
    • Runs as a persistent local daemon with access to the user's files, schedules and memory, plus a web dashboard on a local port
    • Stores external MCP servers' OAuth tokens in the OS keychain and builds new tools itself without approving each step
  • Aident LoadoutMCP server
    • Through connected accounts the agent reads and sends email, posts to Slack and Notion and deletes records: Gmail's 61 actions include permanent deletion that bypasses the trash
    • Aident Vault keeps the tokens of connected services on Aident AI, LLC's side, and task text and service responses pass through the company's servers
    • Paid actions deduct credits from the Aident balance, so set a spending approval threshold before the first task
    • Edits files and commits automatically
    • Can run linters, tests and shell commands
    • Code is sent to the model provider
    • The agent reads and writes files on your computer
    • Stores model provider API keys
    • Can create, change and delete cloud services and data
    • Runs write SQL and produces Kafka messages
    • create_payment_order can move real money once a signing module is connected
    • Requires mTLS certificates and a bank agreement; a misconfiguration can expose banking data
    • The secret URL plays the role of a password and the Yandex signature is not verified
    • Text becomes an agent command with the rights of the Telegram session
    • The integration is experimental, for one operator
    • Stores the Model Studio API key and, when needed, an Alibaba Cloud AccessKey that can manage subscription seats
    • Fine-tuning, model deployment and generation calls spend money on the platform account
    • Installing through a curl or PowerShell script and updating with bl update run code fetched from the network
    • People in a room message an agent that runs commands on your machine with your permissions
    • A daemon keeps a persistent WebSocket link to the hosted part at alook.ai
    • The agent keeps memory and an inbox, so conversation content accumulates
    • In live mode it places real orders, with a risk of money loss
    • You must check paper versus live mode before use
    • It requires secret API keys and access to the portfolio
    • Runs arbitrary SQL against the database, including writes unless read_only is set
    • Holds the ClickHouse password and OAuth or JWE secrets

How we set the access level

Methodology

The editors set the level and the reasons from the README, the way the tool runs and the permissions it needs. Reading project files the agent can already see does not raise the level. There is no automatic code audit yet.